arXiv:2605.23677v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Blockchain systems that settle financial transactions face a structural tension: the validator that assembles each block holds unilateral power over transaction inclusion and ordering. Traditional markets curb this power through laws that prevent front-running and market manipulation. Regulators have flagged the absence of such rules as a first-
AMP (Arc Multi-Proposer Protocol) is a consensus layer introduced by Circle for the Arc blockchain that replaces the traditional single-block-assembly model to eliminate unilateral validator control over transaction inclusion and ordering.
Key Mechanisms and Guarantees:
Published on arXiv:2605.23677v2 in May 2026, AMP is designed to compose with BFT algorithms like Tendermint that support vote extensions, ensuring that financial infrastructure adheres to regulatory standards for fairness and market integrity.
The material addresses a core fairness problem in blockchain-based financial systems: the validator or builder that assembles a block has unilateral control over which transactions are included and in what order. This gives rise to front-running, self-preferencing, sandwich attacks, and other forms of market manipulation that are closely analogous to prohibited conduct in regulated securities markets. The paper frames this not only as an economic inefficiency but as a market-integrity gap: without protocol-level rules, blockchain transaction markets lack the structural protections that traditional exchanges rely on.
Its central contribution is the AMP: Arc Multi-Proposer Protocol, which proposes to distribute block-construction authority across multiple proposers rather than concentrating it in a single builder. The key idea is to provide bounded inclusion guarantees, meaning the protocol constrains how much any one proposer can delay, exclude, or reorder transactions beyond a defined limit. By introducing a multi-proposer coordination structure, AMP aims to replace unilateral builder discretion with a more checkable, protocol-enforced ordering process, reducing the worst-case power of individual proposers over transaction inclusion.
This matters because it moves the solution to front-running and manipulation from ex post governance or regulation toward protocol-level market design. For DeFi, payment settlement, and other financial applications on blockchains, bounded inclusion can make transaction timing less exploitable, improve fairness for ordinary users, and give regulators a concrete technical mechanism to evaluate. More broadly, the work contributes to the emerging literature on fair sequencing, MEV mitigation, and decentralized market integrity.